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Abstract
The Brier score is frequently used by meteorologists to measure the skill of binary probabilistic
forecasts. We show, however, that in simple idealised cases it gives counterintuitive results. We
advocate the use of an alternative measure that has a more compelling intuitive justification.
1 Introduction
Users of meteorological forecasts need to be able to judge which forecasts are the best in order to decide
which to use. We distinguish two cases. The first case is one in which the user plans to use the forecast for
making a certain specific decision the details of which can be specified entirely in advance. The second is
one in which the user plans to use the forecast for making one or more decisions which cannot be specified
in detail in advance.
In the first case it may be possible to decide which forecast is the best by analysing the effect of using dif-
ferent forecasts on the quality of the final decisions made (for an example of this situation see Richardson
(2000)). In the second case, however, the user cannot convert forecasts into decisions ahead of time
because they do not know what decisions they are going to have to make. By the time they know what
decision they are going to have to make, they do not have time to re-evaluate the available forecasts and
potentially switch to a different forecast provider. In this second case forecasts have to be analysed and
compared on their own merits, rather than on the merits of the decisions that can be based on them. In
such a situation, the forecast user needs standard measures which can distinguish between forecasts at a
general level1. It is this second case that we will consider.
Forecasts can be divided into forecasts of the expectation of future outcomes and probabilistic forecasts
that give probabilities of different outcomes. Probabilistic forecasts can then be divided into continuous
and discrete probabilistic forecasts. A continuous probabilistic forecast gives a continuous density for the
distribution of possible outcomes. We have discussed how to measure the skill of such forecasts in Jewson
(2003b) and have applied the measures we propose to the calibration and the comparison of forecasts in
a number of studies such as Jewson et al. (2003) and Jewson (2003a).
Discrete probabilistic forecasts give probabilities for a number of discrete events. Any number of events
can be considered, but in this article we will restrict ourselves to the case of only two events, which we
call a binary probabilistic forecast. We will address the question of how binary probabilistic forecasts can
be compared.
One of the standard tools used by meteorologists to answer the question of which of two binary proba-
bilistic forecasts is the better is the Brier score, first used over 50 years ago (Brier, 1950), and still in use
today (see, for example, Vitart (2003), page 25). Nevertheless, we are going to argue that the Brier score
is flawed. This is not something that can be proven mathematically, of course. Our arguments will be
based on an appeal to intuition: we will present a simple case in which we believe it is intuitively clear
which of two forecasts is the better, and we will show that the Brier score then comes to the opposite
conclusion to our intuition i.e. it gives the wrong answer. We will then present an alternative score that
overcomes this problem, that has a definition that accords more clearly with intuition, and that is also
more firmly grounded in standard statistical theory.
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1A good example is the root mean square error, which is a general measure used for comparing forecasts for the
expectation
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2 The Brier Score
The Brier score for a binary event is defined as:
b =< (f − o)2 > (1)
where f is a forecast for the probability that an event X will happen, and o is an observation which
takes the value 1 if the event happens and 0 otherwise. Lower values of the Brier score indicate better
forecasts. A detailed discussion is given in Toth et al. (2003).
We can expand the Brier score as:
b =< f2 > −2 < fo > + < o2 > (2)
When we are comparing two forecasts on the same observed data set the difference in the Brier score is
given by:
b2 − b1 =< f
2
2
> −2 < f2o > − < f
2
1
> +2 < f1o > (3)
where the < o2 > term has cancelled because it is the same for both forecasts. If this difference is positive
(b2 > b1) then we conclude that b1 is the better forecast.
A particularly simple case is where the forecast probabilities have constant values, giving:
b2 − b1 = f
2
2
− 2f2 < o > −f
2
1
+ 2f1 < o > (4)
A further simplification is possible if the event occurs with a constant probability p, in which case
< o >= p and
b2 − b1 = f
2
2 − 2f2p− f
2
1 + 2f1p (5)
3 A simple example
We now consider a very simple example, with constant event probability and constant forecast probabil-
ities. We set p = 1
10
, and consider the forecasts f1 = 0 and f2 =
1
4
.
In this case the difference between the Brier scores is given by:
b2 − b1 = f
2
2 − 2f2p− f
2
1 + 2f1p (6)
=
(
1
4
)2
− 2.
1
4
.
1
10
=
1
16
−
1
20
=
1
80
The Brier score leads us to conclude that forecast f1 is the better forecast. However, this does not agree
with our intuition. Forecast f1 is a disaster: it predicts a zero probability (a very strong statement!)
for something that happens not infrequently. Forecast f1 is completely invalidated whenever event X
actually occurs (on average, 1 in every 10 trials). Forecast f2, on the other hand, is not so bad. It gives
a lowish probability for something that does indeed occur with a low probability. Its only fault is that
the probability is not exactly correct.
The reason that the Brier score makes this mistake is that it does not penalise forecasts that predict
a zero probability strongly enough when they are wrong, even though our intuition tells us that they
should be heavily penalised. More generally, the Brier score does not penalise forecasts that give very
small probabilities when they should be giving larger probabilities to the same extent that we penalise
such forecasts with our intuition. This is because the Brier score is based on a straight difference between
f and o. Our intuition, on the other hand, considers the difference between probabilities of 0% and 10%
to be very different from the difference between probabilities of 40% and 50%. Intuition apparently uses
fractional or logarithmic rather than absolute differences in probability.
One can easily construct other examples that illustrate this point. The more extreme the events consid-
ered, the more striking is the problem with the Brier score. Consider, for example, p = 1
1000
, f1 = 0 and
f2 =
1
400
. Again the Brier score prefers f1, while our intuition considers f1 to be a failure, and f2 to be
a reasonably good attempt at estimating a very small probability.
We conclude that the Brier score cannot be trusted to make the right decision about which of two forecasts
is better. It should also not be used to calibrate forecasts or evaluate forecasting systems since it will
over-encourage prediction of very small or zero probabilities. We need a different measure.
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4 The likelihood score
The standard measure used in classical statistics for testing which of two distributions gives the best fit
to data is the likelihood L defined as the probability (or probability density) of the observations given
the model and the parameters of the model (Fisher, 1922). In our case this becomes the probability of
the observations given the forecast.
We advocate the likelihood as the best metric for calibrating and comparing continuous probabilistic
forecasts (see the previous citations) mainly on the basis that it is very intuitively reasonable: the
forecast that gives the highest probability for the observations is the better forecast. We also advocate
the likelihood as the best metric for calibrating and comparing binary forecasts. In this case the likelihood
is given by:
L = p(x|f) (7)
where x is the full set of observations and f is the full set of forecasts. If we assume that the forecast
errors are independent in time then this becomes:
L = Πi=ni=1 p(xi|fi) (8)
= Πi=ni=1 oifi + (1− oi)(1 − fi)
We can also use the log-likelihood, which gives a more compressed range of values, and is given by:
l = lnL (9)
= ln[Πi=ni=1oifi + (1− oi)(1 − fi)]
=
i=n∑
i=1
ln[oifi + (1− oi)(1 − fi)]
If we put all cases of event X occuring into set A, and all cases of event X not occuring into set B then:
L = ΠAfiΠB(1− fi) (10)
and
l =
∑
A
fi +
∑
B
(1− fi) (11)
If we now consider the special case in which f is constant then:
L = fai (1− fi)
b (12)
and
l = alnfi + bln(1− fi) (13)
where a is the number of occurences of X , b is the number of occurences of not X , and b = n− a.
If any of the predictions f are 0 or 1 (i.e. are completely certain) then L = 0 and l = −∞. If not, then
L > 0 and l > −∞. We see that use of the likelihood penalises the use of probability forecasts with
values of 0 or 1 very heavily. Such forecasts get the worst possible score, as they should (since one can
never be completely certain).
In our simple example the difference in likelihoods for the two forecasts is:
L2 − L1 = f
a
2
(1− f2)
b (14)
Since this is positive for all samples we see that the likelihood concludes that forecast 2 is better, in line
with our intuition.
5 Summary
Meteorologists have used the Brier score to compare binary probabilistic forecasts for over 50 years.
However, we find that in simple cases it makes the wrong decision as to which is the better of two
forecasts (where we define wrong in terms of our intuition). We reach this conclusion independently of
any detailed analysis of the preferences of the user of the forecast.
We advocate scores based on the likelihood as a replacement for the Brier score. On the one hand the
likelihood is conceptually simpler than the Brier score: it decides which forecast is better simply according
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to which forecast gives the higher probability for the observed data, which seems immediately reasonable.
On the other hand the likelihood accords with our intuition in the simple example that we present, and
punishes forecasts that give probabilities of 0 and 1 appropriately.
We conclude that use of the Brier score should be discontinued, and should be replaced by a score based
on the likelihood.
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